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Abstract: We quantify the link between the timing of state-level implementations of 
political reservations for women in India with the role of women in India’s manufacturing sector. 
While overall employment of women in manufacturing does not increase after the reforms, we 
find  significant  evidence  that  more  women-owned  establishments  were  created  in  the 
unorganized/informal sector. These new establishments were concentrated in industries where 
women entrepreneurs have been traditionally  active and the  entry  was mainly  found among 
household-based establishments. We measure and discuss the extent to which this heightened 
entrepreneurship  is due  to  channels like  greater finance  access  or heightened inspiration  for 
women entrepreneurs.   
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1.  Introduction 
The implementation of political reservations for women in India has been proven to affect many 
aspects of the economic, political, and social lives of women. A brief review, which we expand 
upon further below, links these reservations to greater local investment in infrastructure and 
related public goods valued by women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004b), improved perceptions 
of women by men when exposed to women in leadership roles and greater aspirations for 
younger women (Beaman et al. 2009, 2012), greater reporting of crimes against women (Iyer et 
al. 2012), and more. Moreover, the available evidence suggests these effects persist (e.g., 
Deininger et al. 2011). This literature is among the most powerful evidence assembled for the 
significant economic benefits of gender equality (Duflo 2005, 2011, Klapper and Parker 2011, 
World Bank 2012). 
This paper contributes to the literature by looking at an underexplored issue of the link 
between political and economic empowerment. What role, if any, have these political 
reservations had for women’s participation in the workforce? Despite the many positive impacts 
associated with these reforms, their contributions to promoting women’s engagement in the local 
economy remain uncertain. These relationships are critical for identifying the short- and long-
term impact of such policies. Significant empowerment of women in the workforce and as 
business owners may be the strongest mechanism possible for entrenching and amplifying the 
positive impacts associated with these political reservations. 
We consider in particular the role of women in the manufacturing sector from 1994 to 
2005. The unorganized sector of Indian manufacturing is comprised of establishments with fewer 
than 10 employees (or fewer than 20 if the establishment does not use electricity). Our data 
report gender-based ownership and employment in unorganized manufacturing establishments 
by state and industry in 1994, 2000 and 2005. The unorganized sector is of particular interest as 
it has constituted approximately 99% and 80% of total manufacturing establishment counts and 
employment in India consistently since the early 1990s. We also observe gender-based 
employment in the organized sector, which is comprised of all plants above the indicated 
employment thresholds. On the whole, the female ownership share of Indian manufacturing 
business more than doubled during our period of study: in 1994, female-owned businesses 
comprised 9% of total manufacturing employment; by 2005, this share had grown tremendously 3 
 
to 19% (Ghani et al. 2013c). Therefore it is of crucial importance to understand more deeply the 
factors that have contributed to this sharp emergence of female entrepreneurship and business 
ownership over a relatively short time period. 
Our empirical strategy follows Iyer et al. (2012) by using differences in the timing of the 
implementation of reservations across Indian states. We conduct a panel analysis at the state-
industry level that allows us to exploit this state-level timing variation and differences in traits 
across industries. Industries are defined at the three-digit level within the manufacturing sector. 
Empirical results yield a mixed message regarding the extent to which these reforms improved 
women’s participation in the workforce. On one hand, we do not identify that women’s 
employment in manufacturing increased after the implementation of reservations. This limited 
response is true in both the unorganized and organized sectors, is observed in multiple datasets, 
and it holds for employment in both female- and male-owned establishments.  
On the other hand, we find significant evidence that women’s entrepreneurship in India 
increased with the implementation of political reservations. This increase occurs with a state-
level timing that follows the implementation of the reservations, and the growth persists even 
after controlling for contemporaneous male entrepreneurship by state-industry. We also show 
that the state-level timing of the implementations was not linked to pre-existing differences in 
entrepreneurship by state, further adding to the plausible exogeneity introduced by Iyer et al. 
(2012), and that there is no evidence of pre-trends in the age structures of women-owned 
manufacturing businesses in 1994. We describe below, however, some important limitations in 
the degree to which we can fully measure pre-trends, with our evidence often being indirect. 
We also see evidence of this entrepreneurship response when looking along state borders 
as to how long adjacent district pairs have been exposed to the reservations. This state border 
strategy helps with omitted concerns, but it is not a panacea for all potential identification 
challenges. The approach better controls for local differences in income, climate, culture, social 
norms, and demographics, for example, to the degree to which these factors are common 
between neighboring districts. Also, the approach requires that identification come through 
differential changes for states on one border versus another that are appropriately timed with the 
adoption of reservations. However, the approach may not isolate the impact of the reservations 
from other changes that states may have been made with similar timing. Thus, if the political 4 
 
reservations were consistently bundled into a package of reforms implemented by states (e.g., 
alongside large independent investments in women’s education), the border approach will not be 
able to differentiate the specific role of the reservations. 
We further investigate the channels through which this entrepreneurship flourishes. The 
heightened start of women-owned establishments is concentrated in industrial sectors in which 
women have traditionally owned establishments. Equally as important, the greater 
entrepreneurship is mostly concentrated in household-based enterprises, rather than 
establishments opening as independent facilities.  
We then discuss the potential channels through which this effect occurs, providing both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence. We do not find much evidence that the entrepreneurship is 
linked to changes in reporting or to greater access to government-sponsored contracts and 
business. Likewise, improved financing conditions appear to play a modest role, as the increase 
in female-owned loan-holding establishments is weaker than the total effect registered and 
suggests that financing accompanied the increased entry rather than caused it. We then discuss 
how entry patterns could be consistent with increases at the local level of public goods and 
infrastructure favored by women (e.g., Pande 2003, Besley et al. 2004, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004a,b) or greater aspirations of women towards entrepreneurship (e.g., Beaman et al. 2012). 
We discuss how these stimuli could have produced the industry patterns observed, to the extent 
that women entrepreneurs built upon sectors where women have traditionally been active (e.g., 
Ghani et al. 2013a) and at a household-based scale of operation that was feasible to achieve.  
This study contributes to three strands of academic literature. Most directly, our work 
connects to prior studies of the impact of political reservations for India and women’s economic 
outcomes. To our knowledge, we are the first in this literature to quantify the entrepreneurship 
effects in a panel setting that uses state-level variation in implementation timings for 
identification, with Beaman et al. (2010) providing related evidence using micro-data from West 
Bengal.
1 Second, our work builds upon prior studies of gender differences in entrepreneurship
2 
                                                 
1 Beaman et al. (2010) show an increase in the number of self-help groups with their own bank accounts 
after the implementation of reservations, and that these groups had on average larger bank accounts. To the extent to 
which these self-help groups are associated with more entrepreneurship, this increase would be consistent with our 
findings. We further discuss this study below. 5 
 
and studies of the spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in India.
3 Third, and more broadly, we 
contribute to a larger literature on women’s advancement.
4 
These findings are also important for Indian policy makers and business leaders. By 
2011, India had achieved significant acknowledgement for the level of gender parity in political 
participation and empowerment. For example, India ranked 19th out of 135 countries in 
women’s political empowerment in the 2011 Global Gender Gap Report (Hausmann et al. 2011). 
Yet despite India’s many economic advancements since liberalization began, the role of women 
in the Indian economy still lags well behind that of advanced economies. This paper quantifies 
the strengths and limits of the political reservations in closing this gap. 
The next section of this paper describes the political reservations enacted in India and the 
state-level implementations that we exploit. Section 3 outlines our data and provides some basic 
descriptive statistics, and Section 4 provides evidence on the exogenous timing of the political 
reservations to the women’s entrepreneurship that we study. Section 5 provides our core 
empirical analysis, and Section 6 discusses the potential mechanisms behind our results. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2.  Political Reservations for Women in India 
History of Political Reservations 
The increased role and status of women seen in the 20
th century has contributed substantially to 
the changing economic and political fabric of developing and developed countries alike. While 
much of this progress has come about organically, many governments have implemented policies 
to increase the speed at which gender parity is achieved along various social and economic 
dimensions. One popular policy has been the reservation of positions for women (quotas) within 
governmental bodies. In particular, there have been significant efforts in recent decades to 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Examples of this work include Rosenthal and Strange (2012), Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011), Minniti 
(2009, 2010), and Minniti and Naudé (2010). Parker (2009) and Klapper and Parker (2011) offer a comprehensive 
review of this literature and further references. 
3 Ghani et al. (2013b) and Mukim (2011) provide spatial analyses of manufacturing entrepreneurship in 
India with our data, and Ghani et al. (2013a) consider gender differences in entrepreneurship for India specifically. 
4 Examples include Mammen and Paxson (2000), Dhaliwal (2000), Mitra (2002), Ghosh and Cheruvalath 
(2007), Amin (2010), Field et al. (2010), Pillania et al. (2010), Jensen (2010), Verheul et al. (2006), Bruhn (2009), 
Munshi (2011), Kobeissi (2010), and World Bank (2008). 6 
 
increase the political participation of women in countries where women’s involvement in politics 
has traditionally been low: by 2001, quotas for women in parliaments were in force in more than 
30 countries (Duflo 2005).  
India presents one such case: at the national level, reservations for women in elected 
bodies originated with the 73
rd and 74
th Indian Constitutional Amendment Acts. These 
Amendments gave national support to the formalization and implementation of an historical 
decentralized governance structure known as the panchayat (or, more formally, Panchayati Raj 
Institutions). Traditionally, panchayats operated at the village level and consisted of a small 
number of individuals chosen by a village to oversee various local affairs. However, panchayats 
were not standardized in their structures, organization, operations, or responsibilities, nor were 
they necessarily elected bodies. By the mid-20
th century, panchayats were widely recognized to 
embody “concealed forms of social prejudice, oppression, and exploitation that were firmly 
rooted in local power structures” (GOI 2008). In the latter half of the 20
th century, there was 
support for the revival of a reformed system, with some states indeed restructuring their local 
government systems to provide for the decentralized panchayat system. By 1989 there was 
strong support at the national level to give constitutional status to a broadly-implemented 
panchayat system.  
In 1993, two pieces of national legislation came into effect: the 73
rd Constitutional 
Amendment Act instituted a three-tiered system of local government at the village, sub-district 
(block), and district levels in rural areas of the country, while the 74
th Constitutional Amendment 
Act instituted a revised local governance structure in municipalities (hereafter referred to as “the 
Amendments”). The Amendments intended to provide large-scale devolution and 
decentralization of powers to the local bodies.  Responsibilities of the panchayat include 
administration of state transfer programs, planning and implementation of schemes for economic 
development, establishment and administration of local public goods such as educational and 
medical facilities, oversight of local infrastructure (water, sewage, roads, etc.), and the 
monitoring of civil servants (Duflo 2005). Furthermore, the Amendments stipulated that 
members of the local governance bodies were to be elected at five-year intervals, and at least 
one-third of all seats at each governance level were required to be filled by women.  7 
 
The Amendments required states to adjust or amend local elections to comply with the 
provisions of the Amendments, and all states amended existing laws or passed new laws to be 
compliant within one year of the passing of the Amendments. Compliant elections were 
eventually held by most states/union territories (UTs), and there was considerable variation in the 
timing of “effective implementation” (i.e., the first election held which implemented the 
provisions of the Amendments) across states. This implementation timing varied exogenously 
primarily due to state authorities waiting for the term of existing elected local governing bodies 
to expire before conducting compliant elections. Upon implementation, local bodies were 
randomized for the initial implementation of the reservation system such that the one-third goal 
of seats for women was reached. For each appropriate level of government, the reservations 
subsequently rotate over the included bodies to maintain the one-third level. 
Figure 1 shows the considerable variation in timing of effective implementation of the 
Panchayati Raj across states/UTs. Beyond the visible variation in timings, two features are 
important to note. First, two states incorporated provisions regarding political reservations for 
women before the Amendments. Andhra Pradesh provided for 22% to 25% reservations for 
women in 1964; Karnataka introduced a similar level of reservation for women in 1985 (GOI 
2008).
5 Second, reservations were not implemented in all Indian states/UTs during our sample 
period. Some states (Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) were explicitly excluded from the 
purview of the Amendments. Jammu and Kashmir introduced reservations at a level consistent 
with the Amendments via state-level legislation, but the election of panchayats under its own Act 
has not yet taken place. In the empirical section we describe steps to take these features into 
account.
6  
 
                                                 
5 Kerala and West Bengal restructured their institutions of local government before the passing of the 73
rd 
Act (in 1991 and 1992, respectively), but elections implementing these reservations were not held until after 
enforcement in 1993. Bihar was prevented from implementation due to legal issues regarding certain provisions of 
the Amendments (Iyer et al. 2012). 
6 Data on the timing of political reservations comes from several publications documenting the 
implementation and progress of the reservations (Mathew 1995, 2000; GOI 2008; Iyer et al. 2012). Appendix Table 
1 lists years. Beginning with Bihar in 2006, several states increased their reservations for women above the 33% 
required by the Amendments. These changes occur after our sample period ends in 2005.   8 
 
Literature Review 
A number of studies have examined aspects of the Panchayati Raj and its effect on economic and 
social outcomes. Using state-level variation in India over four decades, Pande (2003) identifies 
how the mandated reservations of legislative positions for minority members of Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) individuals increased the redistribution of resources towards 
these groups, demonstrating enhanced policy influence. Related, Besley et al. (2004) find that the 
reservation of leadership positions for SC/ST individuals increased access among SC/ST 
households to infrastructure or services via government schemes. Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004a) use information on the location of public goods to show that when an area has leadership 
positions reserved for SC individuals, the share of public goods going to that group is 
significantly higher. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b) use village-level variation in political 
reservations for women to predict the types of public goods provided in 265 reserved and 
unreserved areas in West Bengal and Rajasthan, finding that leaders invest more in infrastructure 
that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders. Ghani, Mani, and O’Connell (2013) 
find that areas that have had more exposure to women leaders in the Panchayat system allocate a 
higher share of public works employment to constituent women. This importance of 
representation to policy outcomes extends to many other contexts (e.g., Powley 2007, 
Washington 2008, Clots-Figueras 2011). Overall, the studies show the group identity of political 
leaders matters for the type of public goods provided under the purview of the governing body, 
with studies using the Indian experience being especially prominent in this literature.  
Women leaders may also affect their institutional environment. Topalova and Duflo 
(2004) find that women leaders in India are less likely to take bribes than their male counterparts. 
Duflo and Topalova (2004) and Beaman et al. (2009) note that while the public goods provided 
by reserved women leaders are in greater abundance and at least equal in quality to other 
villages, residents may express lower satisfaction with the provided goods. Another strand of 
literature looks at how attitudes towards women change once quota policies are in effect. Hoff 
and Stiglitz (2010) develop a conceptual framework to show how changes in power, technology, 
and contacts with the outside world matter especially because they can lead to changes in 
ideology. Beaman et al. (2009, 2012) show how perceptions of women improve once men are 9 
 
exposed to women in leadership roles, providing substantial evidence of the framework 
regarding attitudes and bias implicit in the Hoff and Stiglitz (2010).   
Duflo (2005) provides an assessment of the case for political reservations for women and 
other historically underrepresented groups. Using evidence from India, Duflo (2005) concludes 
that reservations have been shown to incur a significant reallocation of public goods toward the 
preferred allocation of the group in power. Pande and Ford (2011) provide a more recent 
comprehensive review of the literature on gender quotas. They conclude that the political 
reservations led to a significant increase in women’s leadership and influence on policy 
outcomes, while noting at times more mixed evidence on some outcomes. This review also 
highlights the need for greater study of economic consequences. 
The above studies primarily use the cross-sectional nature of the randomized reservation 
system to identify treatment effects. However, variation in the timing of the implementation of 
the 73
rd Amendment was also plausibly exogenous, as noted above and further tested later in this 
paper. Iyer et al (2012) use this state-level variation to investigate the effects of political 
representation on crime against women, finding significant evidence that political empowerment 
resulted in greater reporting of crimes against women.  
 
3.  India Manufacturing Data  
Our primary data sources are repeated cross-sectional establishment-level data from surveys of 
the unorganized manufacturing sector carried out by the Government of India. The data are taken 
from surveys conducted in fiscal years 1994, 2000, and 2005.
7 This section describes some key 
features of these data for our study, and we refer readers to Ghani et al. (2013a,b), Nataraj (2011) 
and Kathuria et al. (2010) for greater details and general descriptive statistics on these 
manufacturing surveys.  
Our work mainly considers the portion of the Indian economy surveyed by the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). The NSSO periodically collects information on a 
                                                 
7 In all cases, the survey was undertaken over two fiscal years (e.g., the 1994 survey was conducted during 
1994-1995), but we will only refer to the initial year for simplicity. We utilize the 1989 version of the NSSO survey 
to check for pre-trends in women’s employment in manufacturing by state, but this dataset unfortunately lacks the 
key business ownership variables upon which we build our entrepreneurship metrics. 10 
 
representative sample of the unorganized manufacturing sector. A manufacturing establishment 
is considered part of the unorganized sector if it has fewer than ten employees and uses 
electricity. If the establishment does not use electricity, the threshold is 20 workers. As of 2005, 
the unorganized sector accounts for approximately 99% of Indian manufacturing establishments, 
80% of Indian manufacturing employment, and 16% of Indian manufacturing output.  
Establishments are surveyed by the NSSO with state and four-digit National Industry 
Classification (NIC) stratification. Using the provided sample weights, we construct population-
level estimates of establishments and employment, and we aggregate the cross-sectional 
microdata to the state and three-digit NIC level. This allows observation of state-industry cells at 
three periods during which political reservations were implemented differentially by state. This 
time variation provides for our differences-in-differences identification strategy.   
The outcome measures of business ownership and creation (as well as the control 
variables) are based on the number of observations in each state-industry cell multiplied by the 
sampling weight. In the estimations which use an employment-based measure of 
entrepreneurship, we consider the total employment at an establishment to consist of working 
owners plus any paid and unpaid employees. 
We detect the gender of the business owner based on a survey field which captures 
details regarding the ownership of the establishment. The NSSO surveys since 1994 include 
questions which classify the ownership of each establishment among several types (1994 titles): 
proprietary (male), proprietary (female), partnership with members of the same household, 
partnership between members not of the same household, cooperative society, public sector, 
limited company (outside public sector), or other/unknown. We focus primarily on the 
establishments listed as either male proprietary or female proprietary, which constitute 98% of 
establishments in the unorganized manufacturing sector. The information captured in this field is 
an outcome of the survey and not a factor in the stratification design.  
In our later analysis, we also investigate specifically household-based establishments by 
employing a survey question which captures details regarding premises of the establishment. The 
establishment premises can be listed as any of the following (1994 titles): no fixed premises, 11 
 
premises same as household’s residence, and premises independent of household’s residence. 
Household-based establishments are defined using the second group above.
8 
Our analysis primarily considers recent women entrepreneurs, who are a subset of 
women establishment owners. We identify entrepreneurs using a survey field which asks about 
the growth status of the enterprise over the past three years: expanding, stagnant, contracting, or 
operated for less than three years. Those owners who answer as having operated their business 
for less than three years constitute our subset of recent entrepreneurs. We also describe in the 
next section how the survey collects age information for older establishments.   
It is important to note that the NSSO sampling frame is primarily built off India’s 
periodic Economic Censuses, and is enumerated across households. The core sample is 
comprised of unregistered (unorganized) plants. Unorganized sector firms in India are not 
required to register or pay taxes, and thus the sampling of the NSSO does not depend upon these 
types of data. As we discuss later, this data collection and sampling approach provides 
confidence that the economic patterns we observe are real and not the artificial consequence of 
changes in reporting behavior (e.g., switching tax status).
9  
We supplement our investigation into women’s labor market dynamics using data from 
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The ASI provides microdata on the organized 
manufacturing sector of the economy, which is not covered by NSSO. The two surveys are 
designed to be perfect complements in joint coverage of the entire manufacturing sector. We use 
ASI surveys from the same fiscal years as the NSSO data described above to investigate 
                                                 
8 The categories listed for the ownership and premises fields are taken from the 1994 survey instrument. 
Later surveys expanded the listed categories to include additional ownership categories that do not overlap with the 
primary male/female proprietary categories used in this work. There have been recent efforts to better measure and 
classify home-based work (Chen 2012), and it is possible that some household-based workers previously considered 
business owners may be reclassified as wage workers in future surveys. Adjustments during our sample period are 
very small, if present at all, and would apply uniformly to states in a way that would not bias a differences-in-
differences strategy. 
9 The sampling frame for the NSSO is comprised of two frames: the list frame and the area frame. The list 
frame is used only among urban areas, and is comprised of approximately 8,000 larger unorganized manufacturing 
units on the basis of census data for manufacturing enterprises. These plants meet one of three detailed size criteria 
(available from the authors). All units in the list frame are surveyed, and these units are excluded from the list of 
enterprises in the area frame. The area frame is applied to both urban and rural areas. Village lists from the census 
form the frame for rural areas, and the frame for urban areas is taken from the latest Urban Frame Survey blocks. 
The ultimate stage units are households/unorganized-manufacturing enterprises in both areas, as available from the 
most recent economic census. 12 
 
employment of women in the organized sector. ASI surveys have a similar design
10 and 
stratification as the NSSO surveys, and we construct population-level estimates of employment 
in the organized sector at the state-industry level similar to above. We capture separate men’s 
and women’s employment in the organized sector based on fields in the ASI reporting plant 
employment by gender. We also use the 1989 ASI to check for pre-trends in women’s 
employment by state in the organized sector. 
Unfortunately, ASI surveys do not collect the gender of the establishment owners, and so 
we can only examine ownership and entrepreneurship outcomes in the unorganized sector. Even 
within the unorganized sector, our results below emphasize household-based establishment entry 
rather than independent facilities. This pattern suggests that the lack of ownership data in the ASI 
is not a material concern as it is unlikely that we would observe heightened women’s 
entrepreneurship in the organized sector. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on our sample. The first three columns provide 
aggregate establishment counts, employment, and output for each year across all of India. Since 
we have data on the timing of political reservation implementation for all states and territories in 
India, we do not restrict our sample geographically. These aggregates are broken down into 
organized- versus unorganized-sector contributions. For the unorganized sector, we further report 
women-owned establishments and then household- versus non-household-based establishments 
for women. Columns 4 and 5 describe the growth rate of each economic activity from 1994 to 
2005, and Columns 6-8 provide shares relative to the total. 
As noted earlier, the unorganized sector accounts for a large share of establishment 
counts and employment. Moreover, these shares are very persistent, as discussed further in Ghani 
et al. (2013c). Women-owned establishments in the unorganized sector account for a small share 
of total manufacturing activity: in 2005, they represent 36% of establishments, 19% of 
employment, and 1% of output. Most of this activity is household based. For example, 90% of 
employment in women-owned establishments was in household-based operations in 2005.  
While being a small share of total activity, women-owned establishments have 
experienced much more rapid growth during the 1994-2005 period than the manufacturing sector 
                                                 
10 The ASI sampling frame is based on business registers rather than the Economic Census. 13 
 
as a whole. While manufacturing employment generally grew 17% from 1994 to 2005, 
employment in women-owned establishments in the unorganized sector grew 138%, roughly 
doubling the share of total activity accounted for by these establishments. As the second break-
out for employment data highlights, this ownership growth is substantially stronger than even the 
employment growth for women in the unorganized sector, which expanded 26%. Our study 
analyzes in part the extent to which political reservations for women can account for this strong 
performance on the ownership margin. 
Among the major states, those with the highest share of new proprietary businesses in the 
unorganized sector owned by women in 1994 are Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Kerala. Those with the lowest share of female entrepreneurs are Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Similar patterns hold across states when 
comparing overall business ownership rates by gender. All but one state (Sikkim) saw an 
increase in the share of new businesses owned by women during the period we study. 
Women’s entrepreneurship and business ownership rates relative to men are highest 
among traditional and low-technology industries such as tobacco, paper, textiles, and wood 
products. These same industries comprise the industries in which most women-owned businesses 
are found in absolute terms. During our sample period, more than 90% of new female-owned 
businesses were found in 6 of 22 broad two-digit industries: textiles, tobacco, wood products, 
food products, furniture, and chemical products. At the two-digit level, nine industries saw an 
increase in the share of new businesses created by women between 1994 and 2005, with the 
largest increases for female entrepreneurship being among these traditional industries. 
Our final data source is comprised of six rounds of the NSSO’s household-level 
Employment-Unemployment survey conducted from 1983 to 2009. The sampling frame for these 
surveys captures a representative sample of the Indian population, and aggregate figures are 
calculated based on the sampling weights provided with the data. The surveys lack the ownership 
fields required to study entrepreneurship, but they do contain information that allows us to model 
women’s employment in unorganized manufacturing. In the typical survey, 3%-4% of women 
are employed in manufacturing, with over 60% of women listing domestic activities. We 
specifically use the designation of the respondent’s employer as an Own Account Enterprise 
(OAE) to proxy for the unorganized sector. These surveys aid our empirical work in three ways: 14 
 
1) providing a second set of estimations regarding women’s employment in manufacturing 
during our core sample period, 2) allowing us to assess whether pre-trends exist with respect to 
this employment, and 3) providing us insight about whether the changes that we observe with 
respect to the manufacturing sector appear to be pulling from other sectors.   
 
4.  Analysis of Reform Timing and Pre-Existing Entrepreneurship  
Iyer et al. (2012) introduce the technique of using state-level variation in the timing of effective 
implementation of the Indian reservations. Iyer et al. (2012) further provide evidence that the 
effects that they document of the reservations on state-level reporting of crime against women 
follow after the implementations with timing that indicates the reservations were implemented in 
a manner plausibly exogenous to their outcome of interest. This section provides similar 
evidence with respect to our measures of women-owned establishments. 
Figure 2 first analyzes initial economic conditions of states in 1994 and the order in 
which states implemented the reservations. The upper left panel starts with a cross-sectional plot 
of the log count of women-owned establishments per capita in the state on the vertical axis 
against the year of reservation implementation by state on the horizontal axis. Bubble size 
indicates the size of the state using log population. States that never adopt the reforms are 
excluded from this analysis and the similar one for Figure 3. 
The trend line in this panel is flat, indicating that the timing of implementation was not 
linked to the initial prevalence of women-owned manufacturing establishments in the state. The 
same holds in the lower left panel, which considers the shares of unorganized manufacturing 
establishments that are women owned. The two right panels provide similar graphs of initial 
women’s entrepreneurship for manufacturing in the states using new establishments from the 
NSSO. Again, the relationship is very limited, if any exists at all. The t-statistics for all trend 
lines are less than one with robust standard errors. 
As Manipur is a persistent outlier on these graphs, we cap its value at the second highest 
state’s value for visual ease. Given Manipur’s very small size and mid-point timing for 
implementation of political reservations, this treatment does not affect trend lines calculated. 
Likewise, the very small state of Arunachal Pradesh shows very low initial activity by women in 15 
 
manufacturing and very late implementation. We have confirmed that that all results in the paper 
hold if excluding Arunachal Pradesh. 
We conduct much of our empirical analysis at the state-industry level. Figure 3 repeats 
Figure 2 at this disaggregated level. The horizontal axis continues to be the timing of each state’s 
implementation, while the vertical axis documents pre-existing women’s entrepreneurship on a 
per-worker basis or as a share of activity. For the left two panels on women’s ownership shares, 
there is again little evidence of a relationship to the sequence of state implementations. The 
added data variation allows for more precise trend lines, but we continue to reject the hypothesis 
that the trend lines are different from zero. For the right two panels on new establishments, we 
do see more evidence that later-adopting states have lower entrepreneurship when each industry 
is treated separately. These trend lines are statistically significant. On the whole, however, they 
are very small in size relative to the magnitudes that we will estimate due to the reforms. 
As a complement to these levels of activity and shares in 1994, we would ideally be able 
to examine changes in women’s entrepreneurship and ownership rates over the period 
immediately before 1994 to check whether there are pre-trends in the data that correlate with the 
relative timing of state implementations. We are unfortunately not able to conduct this analysis 
directly because 1994 is the first survey to collect gender-differentiated ownership information. 
We are, however, able to achieve the spirit of this check for pre-trends in two complementary 
ways. 
First, the 1994 NSSO data include the ages of plants beyond the 0-3 years-old group that 
we use to define entrepreneurship.
11 One approach to testing for pre-trends is to look at the age 
structure of women-owned businesses in 1994 by the dates at which states will implement the 
elections. If there are substantial pre-trends for early adopters in the years immediately before 
1994, one might anticipate seeing an abnormal profile for early adopters indicative of a pre-trend 
in entry levels.  
Figure 4 shows that early and late adopters of the political reform have similar plant age 
profiles for women-owned businesses overall. In each panel, the horizontal axis provides seven 
age groups for establishments: 0-1 years, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, 6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-25 years, 
                                                 
11 This age detail was dropped from the questionnaire in later rounds of the survey. 16 
 
and 26+ years.
12 We divide our sample into states implementing reservations before 1996, states 
implementing reservations in 1996 and afterwards, and states never implementing reservations. 
There are equivalent numbers of states in these groups at 11, 11, and 10 states, respectively.  
Panels A and B provide the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for female- and male-
owned establishments across the establishment age categories, respectively. As a whole, the 
differences between the three groups are quite limited.  Moreover, what differences do exist do 
not display a particular ordering that would cause concern—states that implement reforms prior 
to 1996 are positioned between the states that will later adopt the reforms versus those that do 
not adopt the set-asides at all during our sample period. 
Panel C next documents within each establishment age category the share of plants that 
are owned by women in 1994 for the three groups. The overall penetration of women-owned 
businesses is higher in 1994 for younger establishments, peaking with the group that is 4-5 years 
old. This is also visible in Panels A and B by noticing the upward shift at the lower end of the 
distribution for the women-owned CDF compared to the male-owned CDF. All three groups 
display this property of a larger relative presence for women-owned business among young 
establishments, although the distribution is smoother for the never-adopting states. Panel D 
shows this uniformity even more sharply by dividing these shares by the average of each group 
across all age buckets (with the overall averages having been the subject of Figures 2 and 3). In 
this normalized format, there is an extremely close correspondence between states adopting 
before 1996 and those adopting 1996 and afterwards. A Pearson chi-squared test for Panel D 
does not reject the null hypothesis that the states adopting before 1996 and those adopting 1996 
and afterwards are similar. 
Overall, Figure 4 suggests that the age structure is quite similar for establishments across 
different groups of states that will be adopting the reforms at different times. Examining the age 
distribution for evidence of pre-trends is not a perfect test, as it could be that new entrants go out 
of business so rapidly as to not influence the medium-run age distributions of plants. Likewise, 
1994 is of differing distances from the reform dates for states, which may limit the potential to 
detect pre-trends. While acknowledging these limitations, it is reassuring to note that the sizes of 
                                                 
12 Appendix Figure 1 shows an alternative grouping of 0-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-15, 16-25, and 26+ years. 17 
 
the 4-5 and 6-7 year-old groups are as large as the 0-1 and 2-3 year-old groups (in absolute terms 
and relative to men). This indicates that tremendous churn at the entry margin is unlikely to be 
occurring, providing evidence against pre-trends that are influencing the timing of elections. 
Based upon Figure 4’s deviations for never-adopting states, we will specifically test below that 
our results are robust to this group’s inclusion or exclusion. 
As a second approach, we look for pre-trends in women’s involvement in manufacturing 
on dimensions other than entrepreneurship. We can do this with respect to women’s raw 
employment in manufacturing and their share of manufacturing employment in three ways: the 
unorganized sector through the 1989 and 1994 NSSO surveys, the organized sector through the 
1989 and 1994 ASI surveys, and the household surveys from 1987 and 1993.  Appendix Table 2 
reports an analysis similar to that in Figures 2 and 3.  
We examine the degree to which the log growth in women’s employment by state or 
state-industry in the years preceding our sample period correlates with future election timing. 
These estimations find no evidence that changes in women’s employments in manufacturing in 
the pre-period predict the ordering of implementations across states. These tests are also 
admittedly imperfect, as we do not later observe a strong response on this margin, and we 
unfortunately cannot measure the entry margin similarly. Nonetheless, the combination of these 
tests with those of the 1994 establishment age distributions do provide substantial support to our 
identification assumption that the election timings are exogenous. After we introduce our 
estimation strategy, we further examine dynamic estimations that also show the responses in 
women’s entrepreneurship follow the reforms in a timing that is consistent with the reservations 
causing the increased entry rates. 
 
5.  Empirical Analysis 
This section provides our core empirical results. We begin with a broad analysis of the impact 
for women in manufacturing that includes wage employment and establishment ownership. After 
observing the concentrated impact on entrepreneurship, we conduct a focused analysis on the 
industry differences and household-basis of the entrepreneurship finding. We close with an 
analysis of district pairs along state borders. The next section will test several hypotheses about 
channels through which this effect operates. 18 
 
 
State-Level Patterns 
Table 2 provides a broad analysis of women’s role in the manufacturing sector following the 
implementation of political reservations. We have 3606 observations that come from 32 states 
(pre-2001 definitions) and 59 three-digit NIC industries.
13 We weight regressions by the log 
initial employment in the state-industry and cluster standard errors by state. Outcome variables 
are in logs. As we encounter some zero-valued cells, we add one to all outcome variables before 
taking logs. This maintains a consistent sample over outcomes, and it is not an important factor 
given our weights of initial employment in state-industries. 
Following the empirical approach developed by Iyer et al. (2012), our primary regressor 
is similar to an indicator variable that takes a value of zero before the implementations and a 
value of one afterwards. We additionally take into account the initial conditions of the two states 
with earlier, partial set-asides by assigning those states an initial value equal to their reserved 
share compared to the mandated level after the Amendments. This approach captures that the 
changes caused by the Amendments in these states were smaller than the discontinuities in other 
states that did not have prior set-asides.
14 
We conduct our regressions at the state-industry-year level to allow for an easy segue to 
the industry differences that we later study. This approach also allows us to control directly for 
industrial composition by state and changes in women-owned establishment activity that would 
be predicted by secular trends in industries nationally. We include in our estimations a vector of 
state-industry fixed effects and a vector of industry-year fixed effects. State-industry fixed 
effects remove aggregate levels differences across our sample in terms of the outcome variables, 
                                                 
13 The total number of possible cells, in this case, would be 5,664 from interacting 32 states with 59 
industries and 3 time periods. This theoretical count is reduced to 3,606 unique state-industry-year cells due to a 
number of state-industry cells not reporting any data in certain years. Nearly all of the remaining state-industry cells 
(95%) have a full panel among the final 3,606 observations. 
14 Specifically, rather than code these two states as 0 and 1 before and after the reforms, we code them as 
0.758 before the reforms and 1 after the reforms. The 0.758 comes from calculating the share of the overall 
reservations that have already been implemented—that is, 0.758=25% /33%. This approach takes into account that 
these states receive meaningful additional reform from the Amendments, but that they are already three-quarters of 
the way to the mandated level compared to their neighbors at the start of the period. Our results are robust to 
alternative approaches as noted below. 19 
 
focusing on within-cell changes with the implementation of political reservations. Industry-year 
fixed effects control for common patterns across states for each industry. 
Outcome variables are indicated by column headers. Panel A models an indicator 
variable for a state-year observation where political reservations have been implemented in the 
state. Panel B includes an additional control variable that is the male-owned establishment 
analogue specific to the outcome variable studied. Thus, the dependent variable in the first 
column is the log count of new women-owned establishments in the unorganized sector 
measured by state-industry-year, and the additional regressor is the log count of new male-owned 
establishments in the unorganized sector in the same state-industry-year. This additional control 
provides a very powerful test by quantifying the relationship of reservations and women-owned 
establishments over-and-above contemporaneous male-owned business activity.  
 The results in Table 2 have a mixed message. On one hand, Columns 1 and 2 show a 
solid connection between the implementation of political reservations and women’s 
entrepreneurship. The elasticities suggest a growth in new women-owned establishments and 
associated employment of approximately 40% after political reservations were implemented. 
New women-owned establishments account for on average 15% of all women-owned 
establishments. In Column 3, this growth in entry is associated with a positive response in total 
counts of women-owned establishments, but this response is imprecisely estimated. This smaller 
aggregate response may be due to the relatively short time frame for these changes to accrue; it 
may also indicate that some of the induced entry is short-lived. 
Column 4 considers the log employment of women overall in manufacturing for the state-
industry, and Columns 5-7 separately consider employment in male-owned unorganized 
establishments, female-owned unorganized establishments, and the organized sector. While point 
estimates tend to be positive, there is no measurable evidence that political reservations increased 
women’s employment in manufacturing. Thus, the implementation of political reservations in 
India connects to heightened entry of women-owned establishments but not to increased 
employment generally of women in manufacturing.
15 From here on, we report exclusively the 
                                                 
15 We confirm this limited employment response for women in manufacturing using the NSSO 
Employment-Unemployment survey stretching from 1983 to 2009. The estimates in the formats of Panels A and B 
of Table 2 would be 0.088 (0.353) and 0.089 (0.352), respectively, quite similar to Column 6.  20 
 
entrepreneurship findings (excepting for the border analysis) as this null finding for wage work 
generally holds in the additional tests below. 
Table 3 uses this same framework to consider several segments of the unorganized entry 
response. The first column repeats the total entry response for women-owned businesses from 
Column 2 of Table 2. In Columns 2 and 3, we separately estimate the log growth in new women-
owned establishments that are household based versus those opened in separate facilities. As the 
industry-year effects can adjust across the columns, the coefficient estimates do not necessarily 
bracket the total effect. This segmenting suggests that the entry is especially concentrated in 
household-based businesses. Columns 4 and 5 likewise highlight that the entry is higher among 
smaller establishments. This intriguing heterogeneity that favors small and household-based 
businesses will be expanded upon shortly when considering traits of industries. The final two 
columns show that entry is higher among businesses that do not rely on external financing, which 
we return to when discussing channels that promote the heightened entry rates in Section 6. 
Having noted the concentrated entry among small and household-based establishments, it 
is very intriguing to return to Table 1’s descriptive tabulations. One striking feature of these 
tabulations not noted earlier is that the growth in women-owned establishments (4.1 million) is 
numerically more than the growth of women engaged in manufacturing (2.4 million). The latter 
measure includes business owners, so the aggregate traits strongly suggest women are switching 
from wage work into business ownership within the manufacturing sector itself. While cross-
sectional data cannot verify this directly, this switching would be very consistent with the small 
scale nature of the entry observed and reflective of the path of many entrepreneurs to start 
businesses in sectors where they were previously employed. At the aggregate level, this 
observation also connects to a sharp growth in women being employed in women-owned firms. 
Whereas 31% of women employed in the unorganized manufacturing sector in 1994 were 
employed in women-owned businesses, this share is 62% in 2005. This shift is so strong that the 
share of female employees in women-owned firms increases from 86% to 92% across the period, 21 
 
as a 250% increase in women employed in women-owned plants (including owners) swamps an 
otherwise robust 40% increase in men employed in women-owned plants.
16 
 
Dynamics Patterns of Entry and State-Level Election Timing 
Figure 5 provides a dynamic analysis of the entrepreneurship patterns to see if they possess a 
timing that links them to the implementation of political reservations. The estimations continue 
with the estimation approach of Table 2, but we introduce four indicator variables for the timing 
of the elections: 1-3 years before the state’s elections, 0-1 years after the elections, 2-4 years 
after the elections, and 5+ years after the elections. Coefficients on these variables are relative to 
the period four or more years before the state’s elections and non-adopting states. The solid lines 
are the coefficient estimates and the dashed lines give the 90% confidence bands. The dependent 
variable in Panel A is the log count of new women-owned businesses by state-industry-year; the 
dependent variable in Panel B is similarly defined for male-owned entrants. Estimations cluster 
standard errors at the state level and include state-industry and industry-year fixed effects. 
Appendix Table 3 reports the base estimates graphed in Figure 5. 
The coefficient pattern for women-owned businesses is encouraging for our estimation 
design. There is no evidence of abnormal patterns for states in the 1-3 years before the elections 
were held, and the entry increase remains slight in the year of the political reform or immediately 
afterwards. This null result connects to the lack of pre-trends noted in the prior section, and it 
extends that earlier work to look specifically at pre-activity immediately before each state’s 
elections (rather than, for example, the trends over states from 1989 to 1994). 
Thereafter, we observe a heightened entry rate for 2-4 and 5+ years after the reform. This 
entry rate is statistically significant for the 2-4 year period and falls just short of conventional 
significance levels for 5+ years. The lower panel shows no response for male-owned entrants 
other than a dip in pre-period. While our three data surveys do not have sufficient power to 
estimate year-by-year interactions with state-level clustering of standard errors, these estimates 
                                                 
16 The share of male employees in male-owned firms is stable at 97% during the period. This extreme and 
growing segregation of the employment bases by the gender of business owner is a particularly important topic for 
future research. 22 
 
provide some supportive evidence that the timing of these entry patterns is consistent with the 
reserved election of the female political leaders.
17    
 
Industry Variation and Household-Based Businesses 
To help understand this entrepreneurship response, Table 4 quantifies the industry traits 
associated with greater establishment entry rates. For all columns in Table 4, the outcome 
variable is the log count of new women-owned establishments in the state-industry-year. The 
column headers of Table 4 indicate various industry traits that we measure at the national level in 
1994 by industry. The key explanatory variable is an interaction of the implementation of state-
level political reservations with the indicated industry trait.  
By tapping into industry heterogeneity, we can provide further structure to our estimation 
framework by including state-year fixed effects. These fixed effects control for the aggregate 
changes in activity by state in each year, including the main effects for state implementation that 
we quantified in Table 2. Thus, we only identify effects in Table 4 by looking at whether 
women-owned establishment entry in industries with a given trait responded more compared to 
other industries in the same state. We cluster standard errors by state-industry to reflect the fact 
that our estimates are exploiting this heterogeneity across industries within states. 
Column 1 shows that the state-level entry response to the political reservations was 
stronger in industries where women-owned establishments represented a larger share of 
establishments nationally in 1994. Appendix Table 4 documents these shares at the two-digit 
industry level across manufacturing industries, which range from over 40% in chemical products 
and tobacco products to less than 5% in over half of the two-digit industries. Estimations exploit 
variation at the three-digit NIC level that is similarly large. The increase in entry rates for 
                                                 
17 Appendix Figure 2 shows our raw data and provides some evidence on these reservations using major 
states within India. For each state and survey, we calculate the ratio of entering female-owned establishments in the 
unorganized sector compared to male-owned entrants. We then plot this ratio across years, with each state centered 
so that the vertical black line at zero represents the year when the state implemented the reservations. While some 
deviations exist, in most states the ratio is stable prior to reservation implementation, and then the ratio increases 
after implementation. Figure 5 quantifies these responses more precisely, but the raw data depiction provides 
additional assurance that the entrepreneurship response is broad-based and not the product of a few outlier states. 23 
 
women-owned establishments is 3% higher for each 10% increase in the extent to which women 
have traditionally owned establishments in the sector. 
Column 2 finds heightened entry in industries that traditionally centered on household-
based establishments, and Column 3 connects the first two results with those noted in Table 3 by 
modeling the intensity of women-owned household-based establishments by industry in 1994. 
For every 10% increase in the degree to which an industry nationally is populated by women-
owned businesses based in the household, the entry response is 4% higher. Columns 4-6 show 
the corollary to Columns 1-3 that the heightened women’s entrepreneurship is weaker in 
industries with larger average establishment sizes, value-added per worker, and fixed capital 
intensity. These negative patterns continue to hold when calculating these three industry traits 
using only female-owned establishments in 1994. 
The skewness of the traditional women-ownership shares raises concern that the strong 
patterns in Columns 1-3 may be driven by just a few outlier industries. Appendix Table 5 tests 
this concern by considering different formats for the industry interaction, building upon the 
estimations in Column 3 of Table 4. We report estimations that utilized the raw shares of 
establishments in industries owned by women operating out of households, these shares 
expressed in unit standard deviation, and indicator variables for terciles of share intensity. 
Similar results are found in these variants, and the indicator variable approach in particular 
suggests that the most important difference occurs between the bottom tercile of ownership (the 
excluded group) and the upper two terciles.  
Table 5 tests other variations on these key estimations. Column 2 shows very similar 
results when using the Iyer et al. (2012) coding strategy that does not consider fractional values 
for the two states that have partial early adoption. Column 3 likewise shows similar results when 
excluding these two states entirely. Column 4 shows marginally stronger results when excluding 
non-adopting states.
18 Column 5 shows robustness to excluding the two industry groups with the 
                                                 
18 We also examine the possibility that the timing of elections was chosen endogenously depending upon 
the desire of the state to implement the reforms. For 21 states, we are able to reasonably ascertain the year of the 
first pre-scheduled election after the Act passed. This group shows an OLS coefficient of 0.343 (0.139)++. When 
using the pre-scheduled election as an instrument for the actual election, we achieve a second-stage elasticity of 
0.402 (0.176)+. We do not reject the null hypothesis that OLS and IV are the same. These results and related 
reduced-form exercises suggest that this endogenous scheduling concern is not critical, but we remain overall 
cautious about strong claims in this dimension. First, we found conflicting reports regarding the years of pre-1993 24 
 
highest women’s ownership shares in 1994. This exclusion is performed at the two-digit level to 
remove industries related to chemical products and tobacco products. Column 6 shows precision 
at the 10% level continues to hold when instead clustering standard errors at the state level. 
Column 7 shows very similar results when excluding the state-year fixed effects and instead 
controlling again for the main effects of the political reforms. 
 
State Border Discontinuity Analysis 
Before turning to an evaluation of the mechanisms that lie behind these patterns, we confirm the 
importance of the political set-asides in a novel manner using district pairs along state borders. 
One question that we have attempted to address throughout this study is whether early-adopting 
states were growing in systematically different ways with respect to women’s participation and 
entrepreneurship than later adopters that led them to endogenously adopt first. A second concern 
that we have been battling with is the possibility that states implemented other changes at the 
same time as they implemented the political reservations. We worked to alleviate the first 
concern with the exercises in Section 4 and our dynamic specifications, and we relied on 
stringent fixed effects, industry variations, and male analogues for outcome variables to get after 
the second set of concerns.  
Many papers in literature exploit another identification technique by looking at which 
villages receive randomized assignments for women set-asides. Even in a cross-sectional format, 
this randomization is very attractive due to how it addresses the above concerns. Unfortunately, 
we have not identified any data sources that combine village- or panchayat-level information on 
our outcomes of interest and these reservations. The most disaggregated spatial identifier in the 
Indian data is instead the district.
19 This level does not provide us the appropriate randomization 
since the randomization is undertaken across villages within each district, and thus each district 
within a state is receiving a similar treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
elections and terms of office for some of the states, necessitating judgment calls in these cases. Second, the 21 states 
for which we could obtain data may not be representative of the full set of states.   
19 Districts are administrative subdivisions of Indian states or territories that provide meaningful local 
economic conditions. The average district size is around 5,500 square kilometers—roughly twice the size of a U.S. 
county—and there is substantial variability in district size (standard deviation of ~5,500). 25 
 
We can, however, replicate the spirit of the village-level tests by looking at district pairs 
along state borders. The idea is to take two adjacent districts, one located in state A and the 
second in state B, and look at their relative rates of women’s entrepreneurship or manufacturing 
employment in 2005. If state A adopted the reservations well before state B, we would expect the 
women’s outcome variables in state A to be higher. Moreover, because state A borders other 
states, this gap in implementation can be different for other districts in state A and their adjacent 
pairs in states C or D. This approach thus achieves some of the randomization and localization 
that the village-level studies capture, despite the fact that reservations for the districts in state A 
are all implemented at the same time and across the same share of panchayats.   
We identify 352 unique, adjacent district pairs that are located in neighboring states. We 
alphabetically assign districts the roles of District 1 and District 2, and our specification below 
does not depend upon this assignment. We then calculate the log ratio in 2005 of the women’s 
outcomes in the two districts—for example, ln([new women-owned establishments, district 1] / 
[new women-owned establishments, district 2]). We then regress these outcomes on the 
difference in cumulative exposure to reservations as of 2005: [years since implementation, 
district 1] – [years since implementation, district 2]). We also include fixed effects for each state 
that makes up the district pair and a control for what the ratio being studied as the dependent 
variable was in 1994.  
A positive coefficient connects longer relative exposure to the political set-asides with a 
greater gap in women’s outcomes along the border in 2005, controlling for what the gap was in 
1994. As noted in the introduction, this test is not a complete resolution of all identification 
concerns, however. Most importantly, if other policies are implemented in a consistent pattern 
across states at the same time as the political reservations, we will not be able to separate these 
effects. We cluster standard errors by pairs of states to reflect the common variation being 
exploited when a state pair has multiple adjacent district pairs. We weight estimations by the 
interaction of log initial employment in the two districts.
20 
                                                 
20 We drop the industry dimension for this exercise to have well-populated cells, given that the surveys are 
undertaken with state-industry stratification. We also focus on just the unorganized sector given the greater 
difficulty for aligning ASI district codes for 1994. 26 
 
Table 6 presents the estimations in a format similar to Table 2. Panel A includes state 
fixed effects, the 1994 ratio control, and the focal measure of gap years in implementation 
duration. Even more powerfully, Panel B also controls for the ratio of the outcome variable in 
2005 using male-owned establishments in the district pair. These estimations again link higher 
women’s participation in 2005 to how long the reservations have been in place, even in the 
presence of the male-owned plant controls. They provide stronger evidence that women’s 
employment increases in manufacturing than our earlier approaches, but this remains tentative 
overall. Most importantly, they again confirm the particularly heightened nature of women’s 
entrepreneurship and new business ownership that is closely timed with the political 
reservations, subject to the identification limitations noted above. 
 
6.  Discussion of Mechanisms 
Section 5 finds substantial growth in women’s entrepreneurship after the state-level 
implementations of political reservations for women leaders. This growth was concentrated in 
industries where women have traditionally owned establishments and in a form that favored 
household-based enterprises. This section discusses potential mechanisms that could be behind 
these results.  
Before considering these channels, it is helpful to depict a little more closely the types of 
entrants that we are observing and the extent to which they may be drawn from one activity 
versus another. This discussion also sheds light on whether these patterns of entrepreneurship in 
the unorganized sector represent advancements for women. This notion has been somewhat 
implicitly held through the discussions, but it should be delineated more carefully. Recent work 
stresses the potential heterogeneity of businesses and opportunities in the unorganized sector and 
how that can influence policy perspectives (e.g., Gunther and Launov 2012). 
Table 7 compares women-owned business in the unorganized sector to those owned by 
men. In Panel A, we present the average values for five metrics over the 1994-2005 period by 
gender and their ratio. Women-owned businesses have about 18% of the output (measured as the 
value of total establishment shipments or sales) of their male counterparts, 60% of the 
employment, and 32% of the asset base. It is clear that women-owned businesses are typically 
smaller. The last two columns further show that they are less productive and capital intensive on 27 
 
a per-employee basis. Panel B shows these ratios over time. The ratios for shipments and 
employment have declined from their 1994 values to 2005, while fixed assets have been stable.  
The labor productivity measure has also declined. Capital intensity improved, but only because 
average employment declined.  
The general rapid expansion in business ownership for women during the 1994 to 2005 
period has been at a very small business size that widened the gap between women- and male-
owned enterprises in the unorganized sector. In 2005, this entry margin was perhaps a third of 
the size of the typical unorganized sector business. Our estimations and their focus on small, 
household-based businesses link well with this margin. Moreover, this reinforces the need for 
channels that support this entry to operate at the very small scale.
21 
In terms of mechanisms, the online appendix provides evidence on three potential 
channels that we can directly test—reporting bias, access to government contracts and business, 
and access to finance. We are cautious about emphasizing any particular channel given data 
constraints and that several channels may be working simultaneously. Nonetheless, these 
extensions help articulate how the political reforms may have had an impact on local women 
entrepreneurs. While financing appears to be the strongest of these three channels, we also find 
that external finance cannot explain the majority of the increased female entrepreneurship that 
we observe. It is clear that more women-owned establishments with financial backing enter after 
the reforms, but this increase is only part of a general expansion for female entrepreneurship, 
rather than the sole driver. 
What else could play a role? While we cannot offer a definitive explanation, our results 
are consistent with two likely hypotheses that we cannot directly test—provision of local 
infrastructure and inspiration for women entrepreneurs. To understand these candidates, it is 
helpful to first discuss why we believe the differences in entry rates across industries particularly 
favored those industries where women-owned businesses previously existed. This feature is 
likely a reflection of a more general pattern for female entrepreneurs to select sectors where 
existing women-owned businesses are strong due to local networks (e.g., Ghani et al. 2013a). 
                                                 
21 Appendix Table 6 provides additional tabulations that are consistent with the induced entry from outside 
manufacturing that we are observing to have come from unpaid domestic work or from shifts away from 
agriculture/mining. 28 
 
The household scale of these new establishments following the political reforms is a more novel 
pattern and follows partly from the fact that most women-owned establishments in unorganized 
manufacturing are household based. 
This related work about the specificity of local industrial networks among women-owned 
businesses is important for understanding the type of local stimulus we should be considering. 
Specifically, the stimulus following the elections can be neutral towards industries in its form 
and still match our cross-industry differences. That is, the stimulus does not necessarily need to 
target industries favored by women-owned businesses. In fact, the more neutral the orientation of 
the stimulus, the more likely we are to observe the industry patterns exhibited, with the added 
twist in this case that industries with a strong household-based nature are particularly affected. 
This is because a neutral stimulus can prompt entry rates that build upon and extend the existing 
foundation of women-owned businesses. 
So what could be the local, neutral factor? We have two candidate explanations, neither 
of which we can definitely confirm. The first explanation descends directly from the celebrated 
studies that began this literature about how reserved leadership positions can influence the 
allocation of local resources (e.g., Pande 2003, Besley et al. 2004, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004a,b). This work highlights how the Indian political reservations stimulated greater provision 
of funds towards infrastructure and public goods favored by the minority group and/or greater 
access to existing infrastructure. This heightened provision of infrastructure and public goods 
specific to women could have lowered the cost of entrepreneurship for women, resulting in 
higher entry rates. To this end, a very consistent finding in studies of Indian entrepreneurship 
generally (i.e., male and female combined) is the important role of local infrastructure (Ghani et 
al. 2013a,b, Mukim 2011). Thus, a greater general provision of infrastructure and public goods 
towards women can match both the entry response and the cross-industry differences. It is 
important to note that this provision would need to have assisted women disproportionately 
compared to men in order for us to have observed entry rates in excess of the baseline responses 
of male-owned businesses. Overall the village-level evidence developed in the prior studies 
would be consistent with our work.  
A second candidate explanation is that the political reservations inspired women to start 
their own businesses. The striking findings of Beaman et al. (2012) are that female leadership 29 
 
reservations in local areas through the set-aside programs increased the desire of women for 
more educational attainment and stronger careers. It is possible that our results are a reflection of 
these greater aspirations. An inspiration stimulus would again be mostly neutral, and thus could 
align well with the industry patterns we observe. A strong factor favoring this channel is that an 
inspiration account would also naturally connect to the smaller-scale nature of our entry patterns 
given that the inspiration stimulus is plausibly most likely to influence entry choices at the 
smaller end of establishment sizes (i.e., those who would not have otherwise entered without the 
inspiration are likely to be those starting smaller firms than those who would enter regardless). 
While both of these hypotheses are appealing, we are cautious to note that we cannot 
differentiate between them. We likewise cannot completely separate them from other state-year 
factors that could be tied to the reservations (e.g., women-oriented policies promoted by local 
governments). Our comparative advantage in this project compared to the emerging literature 
stream overall is that we are able to quantify the economic patterns for the full Indian 
manufacturing sector. Administrative datasets, however, have natural limits for measuring 
subtler factors like women-oriented public goods or inspiration. We hope to encourage future 
research at the village level to pick up on these entrepreneurship dimensions. To date, we are not 
aware of any village-level studies that have collected information about women’s 
entrepreneurship, and our study highlights the high potential return for doing so.  
 
7.  Conclusions  
The implementation of political reservations had strong effects for empowering women in India 
in many spheres. While we do not see much evidence that this increased women’s employment 
in manufacturing, we do identify that women are more likely to start new establishments in the 
unorganized sector after the reforms. This growth in entrepreneurship was concentrated in 
industries that women have traditionally been active in and at the household-establishment scale.  
This study provides among the first evidence of how political reservations can affect 
economic outcomes for women. This linkage is important given that many long-term gains and 
entrenchment of the empowerment benefits from political reservations can be aided by better 
economic opportunities that grow in parallel with political voice. These linkages may also affect 
economies in other ways, given the rise in women’s participation. In related work for example, 30 
 
Ghani et al. (2013c) find evidence that growing women’s entrepreneurship can support the 
persistence of the informal sector in which many of these business start. We hope that future 
work considers other economic outcomes and evidence from outside of India on these important 
issues.   
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Timeline of state-level implementation of 73rd Amendment reservations for women Fig. 2: State-level initial conditions and timing of implementations 
1994 women's ownership and entrepreneurship versus timing of state-level implementations 
0.022 
0.757 
0.832 
Notes: Figure plots traits of states in 1994 with respect to women’s ownership and entrepreneurship against the timing of each state’s implementation of the 73rd Amendment to 
provide political set-asides for women leaders. Trend lines are calculated with robust standard errors. 
Trend line: 
-0.00013 
(0.00017) 
Trend line: 
-0.00004 
(0.00005) 
Trend line: 
-0.00469 
(0.01082) 
Trend line: 
-0.01036 
(0.01281) Fig. 3: Figure 2 at the state-industry level 
1994 women's ownership and entrepreneurship versus timing of state-level implementations 
Notes: Figure plots traits of state-industries in 1994 with respect to women’s ownership and entrepreneurship against the timing of each state’s implementation of the 73rd 
Amendment to provide political set-asides for women leaders. Trend lines are calculated with robust standard errors. 
Trend line: 
-0.00064 
(0.00047) 
Trend line: 
-0.00030+++ 
(0.00010) 
Trend line: 
-0.00302 
(0.00255) 
Trend line: 
-0.00685++ 
(0.00298) Fig. 4: Age structures in 1994 of plants by state election timing 
Age distr. of establishments (A,B) and women’s shares by age group (C,D) 
Notes: Figure depicts women’s ownership rates across the establishment age distribution. Each line provides the unweighted average of states within the group specified. Panels A and 
B document the CDFs of women- and male-owned establishments across the age distribution. Panel C provides the share of establishments in each age category that are owned by 
women. Panel D presents a normalized version of Panel C that divides ownership shares by the average for each group overall.  Fig. 5: Dynamic timing of entry response to elections 
Coefficient estimates and 90% confidence bands 
Notes: Figure reports a dynamic analysis of the entrepreneurship patterns to see if they possess a timing that links them to the implementation of political reservations. The 
estimations approach follows that of Table 2 but introduces four indicator variables for the timing of the elections: 1-3 years before the state’s elections, 0-1 years after the elections, 
2-4 years after the elections, and 5+ years after the elections. Coefficients on these variables are relative to the period four or more years before the state’s elections and non-adopting 
states. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log count of new women-owned businesses by state-industry-year; the dependent variable in Panel B is similarly defined for male-
owned entrants. Estimations cluster standard errors at the state level and include state-industry and industry-year fixed effects. App. Table 3 provides regression estimates.  1994 2000 2005 1994 2000 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Establishment counts (000s)
Total 12,125 16,986 16,948 4,823 40%
Organized sector 93 99 105 11 12% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6%
Unorganized sector 12,032 16,887 16,843 4,811 40% 99.2% 99.4% 99.4%
    Women-owned establishments 2,037 4,419 6,176 4,139 203% 16.8% 26.0% 36.4%
        Household based 1,919 4,146 5,818 3,899 203% 15.8% 24.4% 34.3%
        Non-household based 118 273 358 240 203% 1.0% 1.6% 2.1%
Employment (000s)
Total 34,424 40,702 40,336 5,912 17%
Organized sector 6,775 6,723 7,470 695 10% 19.7% 16.5% 18.5%
Unorganized sector 27,649 33,979 32,866 5,217 19% 80.3% 83.5% 81.5%
    Women-owned establishments 3,180 5,554 7,555 4,375 138% 9.2% 13.6% 18.7%
        Household based 2,882 4,934 6,800 3,918 136% 8.4% 12.1% 16.9%
        Non-household based 298 620 755 457 153% 0.9% 1.5% 1.9%
Organized sector 6,775 6,723 7,470
    Male production workers 3,702 3,414 3,361 -342 -9% 10.8% 8.4% 8.3%
    Female production workers 652 654 728 76 12% 1.9% 1.6% 1.8%
    Others (Supervisory, contractors, etc.) 2,421 2,656 3,382 961 40% 7.0% 6.5% 8.4%
Unorganized sector 27,649 33,979 32,866
    Male persons engaged 18,458 23,330 21,272 2,814 15% 53.6% 57.3% 52.7%
    Female persons engaged 9,191 10,649 11,594 2,403 26% 26.7% 26.2% 28.7%
Output (MM 2005 USD at PPP)
Total 459,689 650,566 870,224 410,535 89%
Organized sector 384,375 501,638 705,215 320,840 83% 83.6% 77.1% 81.0%
Unorganized sector 75,314 148,927 165,009 89,695 119% 16.4% 22.9% 19.0%
    Women-owned establishments 3,154 7,142 10,362 7,208 229% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2%
        Household based 2,071 3,194 5,730 3,659 177% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7%
        Non-household based 1,083 3,948 4,632 3,549 328% 0.2% 0.6% 0.5%
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Source: Authors' calculations using Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample Survey Organisation - Employment/Unemployment Survey (various 
rounds).
Levels Shares of total activity
Growth, 1994-2005Log count of 
new women-
owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log 
employment in 
new women-
owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log count of 
women-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed
Log women 
employed in 
male-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed in 
women-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed in 
organized 
sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.391+ 0.421+ 0.215 0.015 0.075 0.137 0.039
(0.214) (0.242) (0.289) (0.311) (0.266) (0.299) (0.154)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.733 0.701 0.818 0.825 0.817 0.808 0.838
Controls
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.333+ 0.359 0.233 0.089 0.122 0.001 -0.004
(0.194) (0.216) (0.262) (0.205) (0.182) (0.200) (0.110)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.118+++ 0.111+++ 0.216+++ 0.442+++ 0.389+++ 0.515+++ 0.366+++
establishments in state-industry-year (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.048) (0.055) (0.043) (0.048)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.737 0.706 0.824 0.853 0.840 0.865 0.855
Controls
Notes: Regressions quantify adjustments in women's entrepreneurship and employment in India surrounding the implementation of state-level political reservations for women. Column 
headers indicate dependent variables. Regressions contain 3606 state-industry observations and include state x industry and industry x year fixed effects. Panel A includes a modified 
indicator variable for the period after a state implements political reservations. The modification allows for fractional values in two states that had pre-existing reservations that were below 
the level mandated by the Amendments. Panel B further includes a control for the analogue of the dependent variable for male-owned establishments. Regressions are weighted by log initial 
employment in state-industry in 1994 and cluster standard errors by state. +++, ++, and + indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2: Estimations of main effects of state political reservations on women's economic activity
A. Base estimation
State x industry and Industry x year fixed effects
B. Panel A including male analogue of activity in state-industry-year
State x industry and Industry x year fixed effectsTotal Household 
based
Non-household 
based
With three or 
fewer 
employees
With four or 
more 
employees
Without 
external 
financing
With external 
financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.391+ 0.336+ 0.063 0.336+ 0.173 0.376+ 0.144
(0.214) (0.192) (0.145) (0.198) (0.126) (0.203) (0.130)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.733 0.743 0.528 0.737 0.355 0.732 0.457
Controls
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.333+ 0.264 0.042 0.286 0.158 0.336+ 0.132
(0.194) (0.170) (0.139) (0.187) (0.120) (0.186) (0.121)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.118+++ 0.113+++ 0.071+++ 0.099+++ 0.047+ 0.092+++ 0.049+
establishments in state-industry-year (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.737 0.748 0.531 0.740 0.358 0.734 0.459
Controls
Notes: See Table 2.
Table 3: Disaggregating the form of new women-owned establishments in unorganized sector
A. Base estimation
State x industry and Industry x year fixed effects
B. Panel A including male analogue of activity in state-industry-year
State x industry and Industry x year fixed effects
DV is log count of new women-owned establishments in unorganized sector by state-industry:Log share of 
unorganized 
establishments 
owned by 
women
Log share of 
unorganized 
establishments 
that are 
household-
based
Log share of 
unorganized 
establishments 
that are 
household-
based and 
women-owned
Log average 
establishment 
size
Log average 
value-added 
per worker
Log average 
fixed capital 
per worker
Log average 
financial 
liabilities as a 
share of output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.332++ 0.224+ 0.399+++ -0.291++ -0.192 -0.280+ 0.110
x industry trait in column header  (0.129) (0.121) (0.135) (0.133) (0.146) (0.151) (0.092)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.737 0.736 0.738 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.736
Controls
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.335+++ 0.211+ 0.390+++ -0.263++ -0.184 -0.277+ 0.108
x industry trait in column header  (0.128) (0.119) (0.134) (0.132) (0.145) (0.150) (0.091)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.098+++ 0.096+++ 0.096+++ 0.105+++ 0.107+++ 0.107+++ 0.097+++
establishments in state-industry-year (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.739 0.740 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.739
Controls State x industry, State x year, and Industry x year fixed effects
Notes: Regressions quantify industry traits associated with adjustments in women's entrepreneurship in India surrounding the implementation of state-level political reservations for women. 
The dependent variable is log count of new women-owned establishments in the unorganized sector by state-industry. Regressions contain 3606 state-industry observations and include state 
x industry, industry x year, and state x year fixed effects. Panel A includes a modified indicator variable for the period after a state implements the political reservation interacted with the 
industry trait from 1994 given in the column header. The modification allows for fractional values in two states that had pre-existing set-asides that were below the level mandated by the 
Amendments. Fixed effects absorb the main effects of the interactions. Industry traits are expressed in logarithms. Panel B further includes a control for the analogue of the dependent 
variable for male-owned establishments. Regressions are weighted by log initial employment in state-industry in 1994 and cluster standard errors by state-industry. +++, ++, and + indicate 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4: Estimations of industry traits associated with increased entry of new women-owned establishments
DV is log count of new women-owned establishments in unorganized sector by state-industry
Industry trait used in interaction, calculated in 1994 at the national level:
A. Base estimation
State x industry, State x year, and Industry x year fixed effects
B. Panel A including male analogue of activity in state-industry-yearBaseline 
estimation 
from Column 3 
of Table 4
Using the 
coding scheme 
of Iyer et al. 
(2012)
Dropping 
Andhra 
Pradesh and 
Karnataka
Dropping all 
non-adopting 
states
Dropping the 
two industry 
groups with 
the largest 
women-
ownership 
shares
Clustering 
standard errors 
at the state 
level
Dropping state 
x year fixed 
effects and 
controlling for 
unreported 
main effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.399+++ 0.397+++ 0.335++ 0.443+++ 0.378+++ 0.399+ 0.388+++
x log women HH share, 1994 (0.135) (0.129) (0.140) (0.154) (0.142) (0.202) (0.135)
Observations 3606 3606 3300 2834 3358 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.738 0.738 0.724 0.738 0.723 0.738 0.735
Controls
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.390+++ 0.388+++ 0.327++ 0.428+++ 0.374+++ 0.390+ 0.378+++
x log women HH share, 1994 (0.134) (0.127) (0.139) (0.153) (0.143) (0.197) (0.133)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.096+++ 0.096+++ 0.106+++ 0.094+++ 0.078++ 0.096+++ 0.116+++
establishments in state-industry-year (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031)
Observations 3606 3606 3300 2834 3358 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.740 0.728 0.740 0.725 0.740 0.739
Controls State x industry, State x year, and Industry x year fixed effects
Notes: See Table 4.
Table 5: Variations on Table 4's estimation design and sample composition
DV is log count of new women-owned establishments in unorganized sector by state-industry
A. Base estimation
State x industry, State x year, and Industry x year fixed effects
B. Panel A including male analogue of activity in state-industry-yearLog count of 
new women-
owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log 
employment in 
new women-
owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log count of 
women-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed in 
unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed in 
male-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
Log women 
employed in 
women-owned 
establishments 
in unorganized 
sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gap in years of implementation 0.555+++ 0.732+++ 0.226++ 0.212+++ 0.033 0.347+++
(0.139) (0.157) (0.105) (0.062) (0.043) (0.101)
Observations 352 352 352 352 352 352
Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.296 0.398 0.573 0.481 0.383
Controls
Gap in years of implementation 0.458+++ 0.664+++ 0.178+ 0.002 -0.287+++ 0.184+
(0.130) (0.147) (0.098) (0.067) (0.072) (0.100)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.502+++ 0.505+++ 0.956+++ 0.806+++ 0.992+++ 0.288+++
establishments in 2005 (0.085) (0.073) (0.140) (0.100) (0.156) (0.058)
Observations 352 352 352 352 352 352
Adjusted R-squared 0.387 0.424 0.507 0.714 0.676 0.503
Controls
Notes: Regressions consider the impact of state political reservations using district pairs along state borders in 2005.  Column headers indicate dependent 
variables, which are constructed as log ratio of the two variables in the adjacent districts.  Regressions contain 352 unique district pairs, include fixed effects for 
the two states from which the district pair is drawn, and include the  specified dependent variable as calculated in 1994 for the district pair.  Panel A includes a 
variable that measures the gap in years between how long the two states have implemented reservations.  A positive coefficient indicates that a longer history of 
implementing the reservations for one district on the border is associated with a greater gap in that district's values for women's manufacturing outcomes compared 
to its adjacent pair.  Panel B further includes a control for the analogue of the dependent variable in 2005 for male-owned establishments along in the two districts.  
Regressions are weighted by an interaction of log initial employment in each district in 1994 and cluster standard errors by the bordering state pair.  +++, ++, and 
+ indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
DV is the ratio of the indicated trait across the bordering districts
Table 6: Border discontinuity analysis of state political reservations on women's economic activity
A. Base estimation
State fixed effects and the ratio of the specified DV in 1994 for the bordering districts
B. Panel A including male analogue of activity in district pair
State fixed effects and the ratio of the specified DV in 1994 for the bordering districtsTotal 
shipments
Total 
employment
Fixed assets Output per 
employee
Assets per 
employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female-owned establishments 1614 1.35 909 810 635
Male-owned establishments 8802 2.26 2841 2818 1151
Female-to-male ratio 18% 60% 32% 29% 55%
Ratio in 1994 29% 67% 31% 37% 38%
Ratio in 2000 17% 58% 34% 29% 58%
Ratio in 2005 15% 54% 31% 24% 53%
Table 7: Average establishment traits by gender of owner
A. Averages over 1994-2005 period
B. Trend in ratio during the 1994-2005 period
Notes: Tabulations depict traits of establishments by gender of business owner taken from NSS.1 
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A1.  Empirical Analysis 
This appendix provides additional empirical analyses to support those in the main text. App. 
Tables 1-5 are mentioned directly in the main analysis. An earlier draft of this paper also 
confirms the robustness of the household-based response when using estimations based upon 
cells with four dimensions: state, industry, year, and establishment type. These estimations are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
A2.  Extended Discussion of Mechanisms 
Section 6 considers the mechanisms that might lie behind substantial growth in women’s 
entrepreneurship after the state-level implementations of political reservations for women 
leaders. This appendix provides more direct evidence on three channels: reporting bias, access to 
government contracts and business, and access to finance. We also provide a more extended 
discussion of the literature behind the female industrial networks highlighted when discussing 
the infrastructure and aspiration channels. 
 
Additional Background 
As a second background piece to Table 7, Appendix Table 6 presents the breakdown of 
employment shares and mean wages from five rounds of the NSSO’s household-level 
Employment-Unemployment survey. These figures highlight two important features for us. First, 
the share of manufacturing in these surveys fluctuates between 3% and 4% during this period.
1 
                                                 
1 There is an important difference in what the household surveys capture with respect to labor force 
activities. Employment shares generated from the household data rely on the industry code reported by respondents’ 
“usual principal activity”. It is likely the case that the principal activity for many small-scale business owners 2 
 
This stability suggests that our trends and results are not reflecting some systematic transition 
from a second sector. Moreover, the relative wage points for manufacturing are at the low end of 
the scale compared to other major activity types (comparable to agriculture/mining and 
substantially less than services and transportation). These earnings distributions, while not 
separating out owner earnings from wage workers, suggest that most of the induced entry from 
outside manufacturing that we are observing is likely to have come from unpaid domestic work 
or from shifts away from agriculture/mining. An appreciation of this margin is again helpful for 
evaluating potential channels behind these entry responses. See also the related analysis in 
Ghani, Kanbur, and O'Connell (2013). 
 
Potential Channel: Reporting Bias 
Iyer et al. (2012) find that reported crimes against women increased after state-level 
implementations of political reservations. They credit this increase not to higher underlying 
crime rates, but instead greater confidence among women to report crimes. One possible channel 
for our findings is that a similar growth in confidence or security led women to be more likely to 
report their household-based establishments after the reservations were implemented. 
We doubt that this type of phenomena is behind our work for two reasons. First, 
conversations with experts on Indian data and the NSSO surveying procedures have not raised 
flags about this concern. As discussed in Section 3, the structure of the NSSO sampling frames 
does not build upon features like tax payments or business registrations, instead being derived 
from the Economic Census and household enumeration. This NSSO design limits the potential 
for any structural response being captured by our data due to these reforms. As these firms are 
legally permitted to be unorganized, there is no incentive to evade surveys. We have also 
identified a field in the NSSO that allows the enumerator to indicate whether respondents appear 
to be non-responsive or evasive. While the variable is only modestly populated, we have not 
identified any patterns to suggest behavioral changes of female-owned establishments around the 
reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(especially female, household-based entrepreneurs) is indeed other than their manufacturing activity. In the 
establishment surveys, businesses are surveyed regardless of the intensity with which the owner is involved. 3 
 
Second, the pattern of results speaks against this interpretation. We find that entry 
increased disproportionately in industries where women establishment owners were more 
concentrated before the reforms nationally. It seems to us unlikely that there would have been 
systematically more under-reporting in industries where women’s ownership rates were very 
high.     
 
Potential Channel: Access to Government Contracts or Business 
A second potential channel is that placing women in political positions led to increased 
government contracts and related business flowing to women-owned establishments, which 
prompted the higher entry rates. This could have been due to politicians enacting explicit set-
asides of government contracts for women, favoritism in how contracts were awarded (or the 
weakening of a prior bias towards male-owned businesses), and/or the general redistribution of 
government expenditure towards industries and goods where women-owned businesses were 
better able to secure and fulfill contracts (without explicit set-asides or changes in how contracts 
are awarded).  
Two questions on the NSSO survey inquire about the extent to which the manufacturing 
establishment either buys from or sells to the government. The questions are only included on the 
surveys after 2000, so we are unable to undertake a full quantitative analysis in a pre-post format 
of their response such as we did in Table 3 on other dimensions. Yet, the data are useful for 
understanding that it is unlikely that the access-to-the-government hypothesis accounts for the 
bulk of our observed response. 
This is most easily observed with the raw statistics. The data for 2000 and 2005 report 
very limited government business dealings for most manufacturing establishments—less than 1% 
of establishments report output being sold to government agencies in any year. Even if 
substantial under-reporting existed for this channel, this very low share is mismatched to the 
large entry response observed after the elections.  
Likewise, the data in their raw format do not align very well with the strong household-
based nature of the women’s entry. In the 2000 survey, 61% of those establishments that report 
government business dealings are establishments that are also based in households. While a 
majority, this share is significantly less than the 94% of women-owned establishments that are 4 
 
based in households. The fact that the government interacts more frequently with larger 
businesses and independent facilities is not surprising. The second mismatch is that it is difficult 
for a government access channel that operates disproportionately through establishments with 
independent facilities to account for an entry response occurring disproportionately among 
household-based businesses.  
A second approach is to look for evidence regarding the access-to-the-government 
hypothesis through the industry-level interaction approach used in the core results of Table 4. 
The advantage of this approach is that we do not need to observe contracts themselves, should 
they be under-reported, but instead only look for evidence in relative responses across industries 
that interact extensively with the government versus those who do not. The measurement of this 
industry-level dependency for India as a whole is much easier and less prone to reporting error. 
Our empirical analyses find that industries with extensive business dealings with the government 
behave very similar to those industries without government dealings in terms of women’s 
entrepreneurship after the reform. Interaction elasticities are very close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. In summary, these inquiries suggest that direct access to government business due 
to female political leaders cannot account for a big portion of the entrepreneurship increases 
observed. 
 
Potential Channel: Access to Finance 
A third potential channel is that the political reservations led to a better financing environment 
for women entrepreneurs, perhaps due to the encouragement of microfinance organizations that 
served women-owned establishments. In the introduction, we noted in particular the connection 
established by Beaman et al. (2010) between the political reservations and the formation of self-
help groups by women. These groups possessed stronger financial backing and bank services 
than before the reforms. Beaman et al. (2010) do not take a strong stance about whether the 
financing was a key feature or not. We further investigate in our study through an examination of 
external financing for women entrepreneurs (which overlaps with but is also distinct from the 
savings and lending enabled by self help groups). 
We investigated the financing channel in multiple ways. These results suggest to us that 
improved financing likely explains some of the increase in entrepreneurship that we observe, but 5 
 
also emphasizes that financing (at least to the extent we can measure it) does not account for the 
majority of the increase in entry. It is clear that more women-owned establishments with 
financial backing enter after the reforms, but this increase is only part of a general expansion for 
female entrepreneurship, rather than the sole driver.  
The NSSO collects data on external financing of unorganized establishments.
2 A baseline 
descriptive point is that only 2%-3% of female-owned businesses in a typical year report using 
external finance (9%-10% for male-owned businesses). This statistic is again informative. While 
it is possible that many latent women entrepreneurs are precluded from entry due to poor 
financial conditions, we should also not be surprised if much of the entry occurs in a way that 
does not display a connection to external finance, at least as our data can measure it.
3 
The first econometric evidence is in Table 3 when we segment entrepreneurs into groups 
based upon whether or not they are using external finance. The group not reporting external 
financing both accounts for most of the sample and also has the higher elasticity response. While 
we do observe some tentative evidence of an increase in firms supported by external finance, the 
bulk of the entry is occurring elsewhere.  
A second approach tests whether the entry response is disproportionately stronger in 
industries that were more dependent on external finance in 1994. This approach has been used 
frequently since Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test for the importance of external finance 
channels in economic outcomes. It again has the advantage of not requiring direct observation of 
loans, just the correct ordering of industries. These regressions are reported in Column 7 of Table 
4. There is a positive elasticity of 0.1 with a t-statistic greater than one. There thus appears to be 
more traction to this story than the previous two, but at the same time, the financing interactions 
are far less than those for the other industry dimensions emphasized in Table 4. 
Finally, the aggregate entry rates potentially mix two things: 1) ability to get loans 
conditional on establishment type with 2) changes in the type of establishments. Especially as 
                                                 
2 External finance is defined to include any loans from central- and state-level term-lending institutions, 
governments (central, state, and local bodies), banks and societies (public sector, commercial, and co-operative), 
other institutional agencies, money lenders, business partner(s), suppliers, contractors, friends and relatives, and 
lenders not otherwise specified. 
3 Moreover, the share of new female businesses reporting external financing declines from 7% in 1994 to 
4% in 2005. The share of male entrants reporting external financing grew over the same period, from 16% to 17%.   6 
 
much of the entry is occurring at the bottom of the establishment size distribution, it could be 
that financing overall plays a role that is obscured by the shifting composition of business types. 
To assess, we estimated a series of regressions at the establishment level with outcome variables 
like loan access and interest rates. This approach allowed us to control for establishment traits, 
and the results again pointed to a limited role.  
It appears that financing followed the increased entry rates, rather than finance playing a 
causal role. This does not, of course, suggest that financing is not important, just as 
conversations about U.S. entrepreneurship often focus on financial constraints even though many 
firms do not take on external financing. But the patterns do suggest that the entrepreneurship 
stimulated by the political reservations had a broader foundation than this particular mechanism 
and that many of the very small establishments created did not rely on loans for launching their 
businesses. 
 
Local Industrial Networks and Neutral Channels   
In a study of spatial entry patterns, Ghani et al. (2013a) observe that female entrepreneurship in 
India is generally stronger in districts and industries where incumbent women-owned enterprises 
exist. Moreover, this study documents substantial and specific cross-industry interactions from 
women’s business ownership in related industries due to the channels highlighted in the 
agglomeration literature (e.g., customer-supplier industries, industries that share similar labor 
needs). These cross-industry interactions suggest that much of the aid to new women 
entrepreneurs from the presence of existing women-owned businesses comes through economic 
exchanges such as access to inputs and sales opportunities.
4 The household scale of these new 
establishments following the political reforms is a more novel pattern and follows partly from the 
fact that most women-owned establishments in unorganized manufacturing are household based. 
   
   
                                                 
4 These analyses using the agglomeration frameworks of Ellison et al. (2010) and Glaeser and Kerr (2009).  
Rosenthal and Strange (2012) document a similar spatial segmentation pattern for female-owned businesses in the 
United States. In a similar spirit, Mandorff (2007) traces out the occupational and industry segregation of immigrant 
entrepreneurs in the United States, which he relates to a model of social interactions, scale economies, and sector-
specific skills. 7 
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 App. Fig. 1: Alternative age profiles for Figure 4 
Age distr. of establishments (A,B) and women’s shares by age group (C,D) 
Notes: See Figure 4. App. Fig. 2: Relative entry rates around implementation dates 
Raw women-to-men entrepreneurship ratio by state relative to reservations implementation Andhra Pradesh* 1994 1996
Arunachal Pradesh 1997 2003
Assam 1994 2001
Bihar 1993 2001
Chhattisgarh 1997 2005
Goa 1995 2000
Gujarat 1997 1995
Haryana 1994 1995
Himachal Pradesh 1994 1995
Karnataka* 1993 1995
Kerala 1994 1995
Madhya Pradesh 1994 1994
Maharashtra 1994 1997
Manipur 1994 1997
Orissa 1996 1997
Punjab 1994 1998
Rajasthan 1994 1995
Sikkim 1993 1997
Tamil Nadu 1994 1996
Tripura 1994 1994
Uttar Pradesh 1994 1995
Uttarakhand 1994 1996
West Bengal 1993 1993
UTs and States not under purview of 73rd Act Amendment
A&N Islands 1995
Chandigarh 1998
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 1995
Daman & Diu 1995
Lakshadweep 1997
Meghalaya n/a
Mizoram n/a
Nagaland n/a
Delhi n/a
Pondicherry not held
Jharkhand not held
Jammu & Kashmir not held
Year of 73rd CAA enforcement
First election with mandated 
reservations
Source: Figure 1.1, Study on EWRs in Panchayati Raj Institutions, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, GOI (2008). Notes: 
Table displays implementation of nationally-mandated political reservations. *: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka had 
state-level mandated political reservations prior to the Amendments. "n/a" denotes that the states of Meghalaya, 
Mizoram and Nagaland, and the national capital territory of Delhi are excluded from the purview of the 73rd 
Amendment. "not held" denotes states have not held elections subject to 73rd Amendment provisions up to this point.
State
App. Table 1: Effective implementation by state of political reservationsASI: Log 
growth in 
women's 
manufacturing 
employment
ASI: Change 
in share of 
manufacturing 
employees that 
are women
NSS: Log 
growth in 
women's 
manufacturing 
employment
NSS: Change 
in share of 
manufacturing 
employees that 
are women
NSS Household 
Surveys: Log 
growth in 
women's wage 
manufacturing 
employment
NSS Household 
Surveys: Change 
in share of wage-
earning 
manufacturing 
employees that 
are women
NSS Household 
Surveys: Log 
growth in 
women's OAE 
manufacturing 
employment
NSS Household 
Surveys: Change 
in share of OAE 
manufacturing 
employees that 
are women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year of first election 0.02182 0.00025 0.01663 -0.00507 0.20612 0.00451 0.14174 0.02193
under 73rd Amendment (0.07430) (0.00308) (0.05973) (0.01420) (0.21499) (0.00556) (0.23612) (0.02658)
Observations 23 23 26 26 26 26 26 26
Year of first election -0.01016 0.00092 0.04646 0.00272 -0.00257 0.00523 0.04183 0.00748
under 73rd Amendment (0.02368) (0.00229) (0.03693) (0.00293) (0.04772) (0.00405) (0.07501) (0.00641)
Observations 874 871 772 772 374 298 374 304
App. Table 2: Tests for pre-trends in women's employment in manufacturing from 1989 to 1994
A. Estimation at state level
B. Estimation at state-industry level
Notes: Regressions check for pre-trends in women's employment in manufacturing during the 1989-1994 period before the elections began. Estimations in Panel A are similar to Figure 2 in looking at 
patterns at the state level. Estimations in Panel B are similar to Figure 3 in looking at patterns at the state-industry level. Regressions include a unreported constant and report robust standard errors. All 
R2 values are less than 0.01. +++, ++, and + indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.Log count of new women-
owned businesses 
Log count of new male-owned 
businesses 
(1) (2)
(0,1) 1-3 years before a state implements political reservations 0.046 -0.494++
(0.183) (0.206)
(0,1) 0-1 years after a state implements political reservations 0.086 0.001
(0.242) (0.265)
(0,1) 2-4 years after a state implements political reservations 0.410+ 0.040
(0.245) (0.278)
(0,1) 5+ years after a state implements political reservations 0.407 -0.107
(0.263) (0.309)
Observations 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.732 0.768
Controls
App. Table 3: Estimates in Figure 5
State x industry and Industry x year fixed effects
Notes: See Figure 5.Industry
Share of 
establishments owned 
by women
Share of 
establishments owned 
by women and located 
in households
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 68% 61%
16 Tobacco Products 43% 43%
21 Paper and Paper Products 36% 35%
17 Textiles 32% 30%
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 18% 18%
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork, except  Furniture; Articles of Straw and Plating Materials 15% 14%
18 Wearing Apparel; Dressing and Dyeing of Fur 12% 9%
36 Furniture; Manufacturing N.E.C. 10% 9%
15 Food Products and Beverages 9% 8%
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 5% 2%
19 Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Luggage, Handbags Saddlery, Harness and Footwear 4% 4%
35 Other Transport Equipment 3% 2%
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 2% 1%
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 2% 1%
27 Basic Metals 2% 1%
29 Machinery and Equipment  N.E.C. 2% 0%
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus N.E.C. 1% 1%
28 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment 1% 1%
32 Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 1% 1%
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 1% 0%
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 0% 0%
30 Office, Accounting, Computing Machinery 0% 0%
App. Table 4: Shares of establishments in unorganized sector owned by women in 1994(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.399+++ 0.390+++
x log women HH share  (0.135) (0.134)
(0,1) state has political reservations 3.097++ 3.038++
x women HH share in raw form  (1.257) (1.224)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.416++ 0.408++
x women HH share in unit standard deviations  (0.169) (0.165)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.510+ 0.490+
x (0,1) women HH share in 33-66th percentile (0.296) (0.297)
(0,1) state has political reservations 0.835++ 0.810++
x (0,1) women HH share above 66th percentile (0.347) (0.347)
DV analogue for male-owned 0.096+++ 0.096+++ 0.096+++ 0.096+++
establishments in state-industry-year (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606 3606
Adjusted R-squared 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.737 0.740 0.741 0.741 0.740
Controls
App. Table 5: Variations on Table 4's interaction approach for industry traits
State x industry, State x year, and Industry x year fixed effects
Notes: See Table 4. Columns 1 and 5 report the baseline estimations from Table 4 that consider interactions with the log share of unorganized establishments that are household-based (HH) and 
women-owned in 1994. Columns 2 and 6 and Columns 3 and 7 consider shares in their raw formats and expressed as unit standard deviations, respectively. Columns 4 and 8 consider indicators 
for the middle and high portions of the distribution. All interactions are calculated with 1994 industry data.
DV is log count of new women-owned establishments in unorganized sector by state-industry1987 1993 1999 2004 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic activities 60% 64% 63% 60% 68%
Agriculture and mining 29% 27% 27% 28% 21%
Manufacturing 3% 3% 3% 4% 3%
Services and transportation 6% 6% 6% 7% 7%
Agriculture and mining 162 155 195 188 298
Manufacturing 145 191 198 173 253
Services and transportation 251 195 179 264 356
Agriculture and mining 237 352 442 499 695
Manufacturing 390 476 563 541 908
Services and transportation 862 819 1284 1164 1722
App. Table 6: Primary activity of women and earnings
A. Share of women's activity over 1987-2009 period
B. Average monthly earnings for workers listing main activity as OAE
(2005 constant INR)
C. Average monthly earnings for workers listing main activity as wage work
(2005 constant INR)
Notes: Tabulations depict traits of women workers taken from household-level surveys.